Alex Gallagher’s Bylines Scotland article, “Too wee, too poor is a nationalist red herring” (18 March 2026) poses some challenging questions for the proponents of an independent Scotland. This article considers the points he made on defence.
“How can it possibly make sense,” he asks, “in such perilous circumstances, to weaken the UK military of which we are a key component? How would a newly independent Scotland, with no military plan and minimal or barely defined and organised forces, defend its borders? How would it deter Putin? Would we be in or out of NATO? …”
Most of these issues were in fact addressed in the 2014 Independence White Paper. The thinking has evolved – but I agree with Mr Gallagher – not nearly enough. However, I would argue that neither the threats, nor the current quality of Britain’s defences against them, are as he implies.
The Putin ‘bogeyman’
Let’s first consider the Putin ‘bogeyman’. Defence experts argue convincingly that, rather than defending us, the UK’s nukes make Scotland a target. Further, as many have pointed out, our ‘independent’ deterrent is less independent than we and our politicians might have thought. As things stand, the nuclear deterrent is neither dependable nor affordable.
As for the conventional threat, Putin failed to invade a country next door, and his Black Sea Fleet was defeated by Ukraine, a country that doesn’t even have a navy. How would Russian soldiers get here to invade us? Why would they even bother when they have deeply penetrated the UK and US elites?
Successive UK governments have drastically weakened UK defence with no input from Scotland. Our operational fleet now seems to comprise of just one destroyer, one or two frigates, one aircraft carrier, and one attack submarine. The Army’s new Ajax recce vehicles have cost £6bn so far and are unusable. NATO is in crisis and may not survive in its current form. The UK protects us? Seriously?
Scotland is a small country with a lot of sea
The UK’s desire to be a ‘global power’ with ‘global reach’ is reflected in its large defence budget (yet not large enough, we are told) and complex force structure. An independent 21st century Scotland would need a very different defence posture, as befits a small maritime nation in a strategically important place.
During the 2014 referendum, thinking on defence policy for an independent Scotland could be summarised as, we could have roughly 8% of Britain’s armed forces. A moment’s thought makes it clear we shouldn’t take that notion too literally. What earthly use would one sixth of one of the two aircraft carriers be to Scotland – or indeed the remaining five-sixths to the rest of the UK?
Perhaps the wackiest assumption prevailing at that time was that an independent Scotland should maintain a mechanised army brigade, capable of supporting a battalion-sized battle group overseas on UN-type peace-keeping missions. Mechanised battlegroups are good for invading dry flat countries, not for defending boggy hilly ones. For an independent Scotland, being able to deploy and support a mechanised battlegroup on sustained overseas operations would drastically distort the whole force structure. Not only would it be very costly, but it would also be ill-adapted to dealing with realistic threats closer to home.
Thinking clearly about threats and capabilities
An independent Scotland would need to be very clear-headed about its position within a European defence context, and the capabilities needed to counter the real, as opposed to imagined, threats it might face.
Three principles should apply to an independent Scotland’s defence policy:
First, only concern ourselves with real and credible threats to Scotland’s integrity and well-being.
Second, when we invest in a defence capability, we do it effectively. Achieve a critical mass that gives our services a world-class capability; ensure we can afford to keep our capabilities up to date; and spend the majority of the money involved within Scotland.
Third, invest in 21st century capabilities, notably drones and AI, that complement and enhance, rather than replicate and dilute, those of our close allies.
The focus should be totally on protecting Scotland, its waters, and its airspace, and its civil society against credible threats, including hybrid warfare, terrorism, and organised crime. Scotland would not need regular infantry, tanks, or long-range transport aircraft. It would need fast-response special forces, capable of mountain, arctic, and marine warfare, liberally equipped with helicopters, boats and unmanned systems. But that’s not all.
The wider threat picture
The information age offers a host of opportunities to hostile states and non-state actors to undermine, subvert, influence, and even control other nations without the need to actually invade the country. The US is quite explicit on its intentions in this respect towards European democracies, including the UK whose social policies it disagrees with.
Attacks on our financial system and democratic structures and governance are more likely than on our physical assets – and more difficult to detect, understand, and defeat. A key part of a re-oriented defence policy would be cyber and information warfare defences, probably collaborating closely with Estonia, Finland, Ukraine and other small tech-savvy European allies as well as the UK; and intelligence, collaborating particularly with the UK.
It is clear from the Covid-19 pandemic, that biosecurity is going to be a key issue from now on. Given that ‘one sick bat’ seems to have crashed the world economy and killed hundreds of thousands of people, all countries need to be much better prepared to respond to pandemics – whether due to natural causes or biological warfare – than most were in 2020.
Sea and Air
A Scottish navy would need ships able to operate throughout its waters, extending 200 miles offshore in one of the most hostile oceans in the world. Scotland builds such ships on the Clyde and the Forth, for the Royal Navy and export. We can extend the production runs for the Scottish defence force.
We would need an air interception capability to patrol airspace and see off intruding threats. Air defence of the British Isles is one area of defence in which an independent Scotland’s interests seem to be fully aligned with those of the rest of the UK. We could delegate our air defence back to the UK in return for our efforts to radically enhance underwater surveillance capabilities. If this proved difficult to agree, we could buy or lease Swedish Gripens, an aircraft designed for dispersed operations and low maintenance overhead, and with a radar built in Edinburgh.
Investing in ourselves, complementing our allies
Scotland would not itself be able to fight off a serious attack by a big navy – that’s what alliances are for. The key in modern warfare is information. Scotland has world-class sensing, networking, and information processing capabilities, thanks to three key synergistic elements: long-established high-tech defence companies (Leonardo and Thales); an excellent world-level research and teaching base; and the recently established innovation centres seeking avenues to exploit advanced university research on sensors (CENSIS) and data science (The Data Lab). And our offshore energy industry has huge expertise in subsea operations.
Leveraging these assets, we should use a major part of Scotland’s future defence budget to fund an ambitious and futuristic underwater sensing programme; to create an integrated underwater surveillance system that would let us spot any military or environmental threat anywhere in or near our waters. This will be more important as the Arctic Sea routes open up, and it would boost our high-tech industry and exports. By having the development capability in-country, we would ensure the system would be adapted to Scotland’s needs and continue to evolve as technology improves.
By spending more on domestic R&D and less on expensive military platforms, and eschewing foreign military adventures, we would keep more of the defence budget within the Scottish economy, increasing the multiplier effect that our defence spending has on the rest of our economy.
By complementing rather than copying existing capabilities, we would contribute more to the defence of the British Isles and Europe.
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