Just as Europe was digesting the return of Donald Trump to the White House, Germany’s three-party coalition government falls apart. Germany, the biggest country and economy in Europe, should be offering the continent a sense of stability during a period where the only constant seems to be instability. With war raging in Ukraine, their defence very much fundamental to Europe’s own security, Germany has failed to fulfil their role of leadership. Europe and Germany will suffer as a result.
Mudslinging press conferences with the FDP (Free Democrats) copping the most
On 6 November 2024, Chancellor Scholz appeared as the first representative of the government to explain what exactly had gone awry. His usual monk-like demeanor with half closed eyes was missing. He was almost ‘lively’ with his thinly veiled anger obvious to the journalists. There was no room for niceties, rather a gloves-off boxer approach pounding into the shortcomings of Christian Lindner, whom he mentioned many times by name and offloaded all the blame on to.
In effect, Olaf Scholz uncharacteristically got very personal and politically assassinated his finance minister. Scholz reproached him for being entirely uncooperative and inflexible when it came to negotiating new funding; accusing him of offering tax breaks to a few at the cost of the social contract. He complained that he was risking the coalition to proliferate his own party and improve their chances in a desperate move to give the FDP more political profile. The liberals are the most junior partner of the coalition and have performed appallingly at recent state elections where they haven’t even passed the necessary 5% hurdle for parliamentary representation. Therefore, there is some substance to Scholz’s criticism.
The ‘Debt Brake’ was the final straw
Christian Lindner had quite publicly handed an eighteen-page paper to his coalition partners on Friday last week. This paper outlined how he imagined Germany could fund its future and circumnavigate the present economic stagnation and dwindling industrial prospects. The report strictly refused to tamper with the debt brake (Schuldenbremse), which is anchored in the German constitution since 2009. It effectively prevents the country from taking on new debt that would exceed 0.35% of its GDP per annum. This is meant to provide good fiscal management. However, with the spiralling costs of energy since the outbreak of the Ukraine war and the need to spend more on defence to provide national security, the Schuldenbremse is a prissy premise. It can be abided by in ‘normal’ fiscal times, but there is a clause in the constitution that allows it to be suspended under ‘extraordinary’ circumstances. A government scrambling to bolster the economy and its defence can trigger that clause.
Failure to agree on what constitutes ‘extraordinary’ circumstances
The FDP however appears not to view the present situation as ‘extraordinary’ and refused to increase spending above the debt brake’s threshold. This arguably forced the Chancellor’s hand. The Greens equally, although less personally, placed the blame with Lindner. Their statement expressed shock and disbelief. They regarded Linder’s move as blackmail, entirely unnecessary and highly irresponsible at this critical moment in political history − the eve of Trump’s re-election. The result being that all ministers from the Free Democrats will leave the government. The ‘traffic light’ coalition, alluding to party colours, has switched itself off.
Germany a politically lame duck
The Christian Democrats (CDU & CSU) have been carefully monitoring the political dissonance within the coalition government and their calls for new elections will no doubt come to bear. However, as everything in German is always done with a sometimes frustratingly long and slow process, their chance of gaining power will not be fast. The Chancellor has outlined a plan to govern with a minority government until Christmas and then face a vote of confidence on January 15. The opposition CDU leader Friedrich Merz is pressuring for an earlier confidence vote; preferably within the next two weeks.
The constitution then would permit an election within 6 weeks. By that stage Donald Trump will almost be in office, and with his promise of “ending the Ukraine war overnight”, the security situation in Europe will be different than it is now. Nobody is hazarding a guess what exactly that might entail. Germany is effectively, as of last night, a politically lame duck. There is also strong concern, that the populist parties, who have performed well in the recent Eastern German state elections of Saxony and Thuringia, will lick their fingers at an election campaign on a federal level. Sahra Wagenknecht, the leader of the populist left-leaning BSW party, makes headlines with pro-Russian arguments and attempts to affect federal security policies from a state parliament. Neither she nor her party are even in power yet at a state level. Putin’s proficiency in electoral interference will no doubt find another outlet for misinformation and hybrid warfare.
Olaf Scholz’s misplaced gamble
The Chancellor meanwhile promised again last night to continue to fund Ukraine to secure Germany’s defence. The bitterness is that Ukraine has needed more than funding but also weapons, such as long-range missiles (Taurus), that Scholz has continued to deny, as did Biden. Time is running out for Ukraine and fear is becoming palpable in other European countries, such as the Baltics or Moldova, where Putin’s imperialist campaign might strike next.
The incremental approach from the Biden administration were the coattails that Scholz, who presented himself as the ‘peace chancellor’, happily hid behind. Now the transatlantic Biden has gone, and Trump has defeated Harris, Scholz is left with a desperately depleted defence strategy.
Scholz no doubt gambled and hoped that Germany could continue to benefit from NATO’s shield under a Democratic president without too much cost or inconvenience. This wish, with Trump as president, will not be fulfilled. Scholz perhaps dissolved his coalition government knowing that without being able to take on significant new debt for defence his government is obsolete. It is a ridiculously late and inadvertent admission.
Tectonic political shifts
The history books will mark November 6 as a day of tectonic political shifts and a day where democracy as a system looks fractured and structurally weak. The autocrats must be pinching themselves how easy it is to destabilise democracies; some even seem to self-combust. A new world order may be about to begin and one that we in the West might find unrecognisable.
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