The war memorial in St Fillans is a fitting place to think of armed conflict in Europe – as in the Middle East and elsewhere. It stands on a grassy plot at the east end of Loch Earn with fine views out over the normally placid water to the distant hills and mountains.
Sitting on a bench there, I often ponder how I was born right at the end of WW2 (April 1945) and grew up in relative peace over the subsequent seven decades, certainly in this part of Europe. Now, in the run-up to my death, I feel a profound sadness and anger that war, slaughter, starvation and grief are dominating the news.
A shifting role for Europe
The EU has played a vital role in ushering in, extending and cementing the prolonged period of peace that I and millions of others have enjoyed during the past near-80 years. But now it is increasingly seeking a new role as a military power/ defence contractor via policy instruments such as the (inaptly named) European Peace Facility and the recent European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS).
Obviously, the Russian war against Ukraine, underway for the past 26 months, has been the catalyst for this rethink, not least since it has exposed the inadequacies of European readiness for war on this continent that has basked in the peace illusion (it turns out) for 35 (post-communist) years. Not only that; it has re-emphasised Europe’s defence dependency on the US during 75 years of NATO – one that so scares policymakers when Trump’s triumphant return to the White House beckons. And while there have been notable successes in burden-sharing, the war has laid bare deep fissures in member state approaches as well as chaos and confusion in their collective responses. These will be stark in this week’s latest EU summit.
The EDIS is an overdue effort to make good some of these inadequacies. As Nick Witney of the European Council on Foreign Relations and ex-head of the European Defence Agency has pointed out, lack of capacity has forced European states to import €100bn of arms (80% from the US) to fill the gap in military supplies to Kyiv. On top, European states are a sorry tale of lack of collaboration in joint procurement or stubborn refusal to back consolidation among defence contractors and equipment suppliers. A telling statistic unearthed by colleagues at the Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin is that there are six European weapons platforms for one American one, signalling huge duplication. Another is that cuts in member state spending on defence have meant an EU-wide under-investment of ca. €160bn between 2009 and 2021.
Raising defence spending
So, up pop politicians such as Jeremy Hunt, UK chancellor, to pledge yet again (at this week’s IMF/World Bank meetings in Washington) that Europeans will look more intensely after their own defence and, what’s more, accept that this means raising defence spending over and above the current 2% of GDP target for NATO members. EU members have announced so far increases in defence budgets of around €200bn in coming years but, as of 2022, military spending ratios vary between 0.2%/0.8% in neutral Ireland/Austria respectively via 2.4% in Poland to a whopping 3.7% in Greece. The UK ratio is 2.2% and that of the US 3.5%; Russia’s economy on a permanent war footing is planning for one of 6%, up from around 4% in 2022.
Aside from the Russian case, this spending boost will prove harder to pull off than political leaders are suggesting, including in the UK which is being warned by the IMF to “take policy action to address fundamental imbalances between spending and revenues.” If Hunt and Rishi Sunak want pre-election tax cuts plus increased defence spending other budget envelopes will have to shrink, especially in a low-growth environment. So, disability benefits? Health? Education? Something will have to give. And that’s true for other EU economies too.
The EDIS, to be endowed with a proposed €1.5bn over the three years 2025-2027 before the next seven-year EU budget (MFF) kicks in, targets 40% of European defence equipment jointly procured by 2030, with half of procurement funds spent intra-EU and intra-EU defence trade worth 35% of the whole market. But the recent history of European collaborative in the armaments field – think the A400M transporter or the new stalled Franco-German tank, the MGCS, to replace the Leclerc and Leonard 2s – does not bode well.
A need for strategic autonomy in Europe
What’s more, it’s not just investing “more, better, together and European” in defence as EDIS sets out but more wisely, effectively, and efficiently. Overspend and delays in the UK alone cost the public purse some £10bn in the decade to 2021; it’s suggested that overspend will be £17bn in the next ten years. Many of us cavil at the huge cost of the Dreadnought nuclear submarine programme (replacing Vanguard) at conservative estimates of £100bn at least during its lifetime.
Finally, unless the EU opts for full federalism like the US, leaving behind the present inter-governmental/confederal/federal mess, efforts to build pan-European strategic autonomy may well flounder on the obstinate desire of member states to retain (and promote) national military prowess/capacity. It’s not just Victor Orban’s Hungary that favours national defence sovereignty.
Maybe a combination of Putin’s forecast victory in Ukraine and Trump’s withdrawal from Europe can hasten European strategic autonomy in the coming years – something this old observer might wish to see – but you and I shouldn’t hold our breaths, even then. And peace in Europe may remain a distant, almost youthful memory while we still live.
Article originally published under David Gow: Cosmopolitan Villager
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