How well can the UK defend Scotland?
Alarmingly, General Sir Patrick Sanders on the FourCast podcast says that the only sovereign defence the UK has against Iran-style missile attacks is our six Type 45 destroyers. Three of them are undergoing long term refits, two are in harbour or working up, and one is in the eastern Mediterranean. None are defending Scotland.
This comes in a climate where the threats of hybrid attacks and electoral interference from Russia are real, and against the latter in particular, the UK offers little or no defence. Where is the uncensored Russia report?
In the horrific scenario of a limited nuclear exchange, Faslane would be a priority target, and Scotland would be safer not hosting nuclear weapons. It’s questionable whether the Trident system is sustainable long term. The reliability of the Trident missiles is in doubt; and the UK depends on the US, no longer a dependable partner, to maintain and provide access to the ‘common pool’ of Trident missiles. How long will they continue to be an effective deterrent, and against what? In the event of Scottish independence, their status, and how long they would stay there would be the matter of delicate negotiation – if they are still in service.
General Sanders suggests that the UK can only sustain high intensity combat operations for a very few weeks.The UK is now having to completely reappraise its approach to defence, and catch up with what Ukraine has learnt about tactics, technologies and logistics of modern war. An independent Scotland must do the same.
NATO and alliances
Speculation on the nature of European defensive alliances in five or 10 years time is a waste of effort: Donald Trump’s and Marco Rubio’s recent statements suggest NATO might not survive the year, certainly in its present form.
Many NATO countries do not host nuclear weapons. Given Scotland’s strategic position in the north-east Atlantic, NATO, if it still exists by then, would certainly prefer an independent Scotland to be in rather than out.
At the moment there are many moving parts. Scotland’s future defence, in or out of the UK, must be based on alliances with trusted north-west European partners – particularly the UK and the Nordics. By the time Scotland might be independent, there will probably be a completely new European security architecture.
How much would it cost?
A new frigate would cost roughly £1bn, fully fitted out and operational. Assuming a delivery rate of one every two years, the capital budget for these would be £0.5bn per year, over 10 years, to acquire five ships.
The flyaway cost of a Swedish Gripen fighter is around £85mn, and whole life cost is £200-250mn. Operating costs are low, and they are designed for dispersed operation with limited facilities. A fleet of 20 would cost £5bn over 10 years, or (again) £0.5bn per year.
These numbers are very rough estimates. However, since they represent only 20% of the putative £5bn annual defence budget over 10 years, they suggest that a useful modern defence capability should be within an independent Scotland’s reach.
Putting together a balanced force structure within these assumptions remains a challenge. The first question is whether we need those frigates. You need three to guarantee one operational. Frigates are expensive and vulnerable. The Ukrainian experience, the demise of the Russian Black Sea fleet, and the ‘What could we do 100 days after independence?’ question, all suggest we should prioritise unmanned systems, and the sensor, communication and decision support networks, to allow their effective use; the right people, doctrine, interoperability and training to use them effectively; and the finance, technology, logistics and production facilities needed to maintain a high tempo of use and adaptation, in the unlikely, but dire, event of having to use them.
The same list of enablers applies to all defence systems. There is more to military capability than equipment, people and bases. Big ticket items can completely distort a defence budget, as the UK has learned to its cost with the carriers.
We can’t afford to invent unnecessary missions for a military force that we don’t even need
The Scottish Government documents of 2013 and 2025 set out sensible proposals for the planning framework and timeline, the arrangements for a handover period, and the transition of people into the new Scottish defence force. Scotland would be defended on day one of independence.
In terms of required capabilities, their assumptions are out of date.
The 2013 document states, “This Scottish Government would also set as a cornerstone of defence policy that an independent Scotland would only participate in overseas military operations that are lawful, approved by Scottish Ministers, and authorised by the Scottish Parliament”.
I favour a shorter statement: “An independent Scotland will not participate in overseas military operations”. We’d have quite enough to do looking after our own patch. Any out-of-area help must be civilian, not military.
The Scottish Government’s 2025 document states, “Scotland would help with missions that support peace and security around the world”, and suggests a Scottish defence force would include “a land component able to fight at the front line”.
It doesn’t mention drones, yet Ukraine now has unmanned systems forces of equal status with its army and air force.
In a recent exercise, “ten Ukrainians with drones wiped out two battalions in a day”. The traditional front line is no more; rather a “kill zone”, 10-20km deep, separates opposing land forces. The days of conventional mechanised brigades are over, particularly in a boggy, hilly country like ours. The cost of maintaining and sustaining army units capable of deployment overseas is massive, yet their effectiveness is dubious. The defence budget of an independent Scotland should be 100% focused on the real threats to Scotland itself.
The Ukraine War has utterly changed land warfare tactics and operational doctrine, very much towards the agile and adaptive ‘special forces with drones’ model suggested in my first article and in Scotland 2070. The first stop of a soon-to-be independent Scotland’s defence planning team should be Ukraine.
A challenge to all parties
The status quo is not as people imagine. The UK has big gaps in its capability to defend Scotland. Europe is recasting its defence architecture in real time.
If Scotland becomes independent, the process the SNP proposed for the transition plan is fine: Scotland would be defended on day one of independence. The “transition to what?” needs an update.
The question to all parties must be: what do you think we should do about this now, under devolution, and in a possible future in which Scotland would be independent?
And for those in or out of politics who are interested in the second question and have relevant experience and an understanding of current military developments: how will our knowledge, experience and foresight be mustered to make sure that an independent Scotland spends its limited budget wisely to prepare for (and hopefully deter) the next war, not the last one?
More from Hillary Sillitto
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